Russian Influence Meets Extremism in Hungary

We often assume that foreign propaganda only comes from governments loudly promoting official narratives, yet the real action often happens on the fringes. Long before Hungary’s state-backed media began echoing Russian talking points and before foreign-influence campaigns like Tenet Media took center stage, a handful of far-right groups were already pioneering disinformation in modest but enthusiastic circles. While Tenet Media focused on influencers with sizable followings, these fringe outfits had to build their channels from scratch. Even so, both approaches reveal the surprising ways disinformation can seep into a country’s political life—or even shape international politics. What follows here is my personal exploration of these lesser-known undercurrents, offering a look at how Russian influence took root in post–Cold War Eastern Europe and how it resonates in the global present.

In 2019, The Guardian and The New York Times revealed that the British consulting firm Cambridge Analytica had harvested personal data from up to 87 million social media users to assist Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign. This scandal demonstrated not only that online campaigns can reach a vast number of citizens but that they are also capable of something unprecedented in mass communication: delivering personalized messages targeted at the individual level.^[1][2][3]

Cambridge Analytica began harvesting user data in 2013; it took five years and a whistleblower for their activities to come to light. They weren't merely focused on gathering data. WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange claimed that the firm's CEO asked him for access to Hillary Clinton's private emails.^[4]

The Cambridge Analytica scandal was not the only incident in the 2016 U.S. presidential election investigated by the media and authorities. Robert Mueller was appointed as special counsel to examine Russian interference in the election and allegations of conspiracy between Donald Trump's team and Russia. Mueller did not find evidence that Trump conspired with Russia, but the report detailed the Russian government's significant, concerted efforts to secure Trump's election.^[5][6]

Western distrust towards Russia has been growing ever since Vladimir Putin's infamous 2007 Munich speech, but Russia's state media has been operating openly in Western countries, first launching the English language television channel Russia Today in 2005, followed by websites and television channels in several different languages. Russia Today later shortened its name to RT.^[7]

2022 was a turning point in the dissemination of Russian government narratives in Western countries. In response to the "special military operation" in 2022, private cable television providers in America stopped providing Russian state media to their customers.^[8] Facebook and Instagram banned Russian state media from their platforms citing foreign interference.^[9] The Council of the European Union temporarily suspended the broadcasting services of RT and Sputnik News until Russia's aggression in Ukraine ends.^[10] Regulators in the United Kingdom took similar measures.^[11]

RT's website remains widely accessible without any restrictions on its content,^[12] but these limitations are a setback for Russia's government media. The stamp of approval of government regulators and private companies used to give an aura of legitimacy that the Kremlin can no longer access - at least not until they improve their relationship with Western countries.

Although we live in the age of AI and big data, having access to these platforms is still essential for reaching certain audiences. For instance, only 65% of European Union citizens streamed television or videos online in 2022, leaving important demographics who cannot be reached by Russia's video content at all. Facebook and Instagram capture over 80% of Europe's social media market.^[13][14]

As later reports alleged, Russia made several covert attempts to maintain its influence over western minds. In 2024, the US Department of Justice announced that they disrupted a foreign influence operation sponsored by the Russian government.^[15] They published an affidavit that justified the seizure of 32 domain names related to this campaign details that Russian media companies coordinated with Sergei Kiriyenko - a high-ranking official in the Russian government - to create "Doppelganger" websites that impersonate legitimate news sites.^[16] This practice, known as "cybersquatting", allowed them to borrow the legitimacy of the media actors they have impersonated while also concealing the fact that the content was directed by Russian authorities, thus circumventing limitations social media sites like Facebook and Instagram imposed on them.^[16]

Another piece of the disinformation puzzle authorities uncovered in 2024 was revealed in what is colloquially known as the "Tenet Media Indictment".^[17][18] The US Department of Justice indicted two RT employees for (alleged) crimes related to covert influence on behalf of a foreign government.^[17] According to the indictment, they set up a front company called Tenet Media. In this operation the Russian government exercised less direct control over the content; instead, they employed a money-laundering scheme to covertly funnel government funds to existing right-wing influencers such as Tim Pool and Lauren Southern, who believed they were employed by a regular US company.^[17][19]

The indictment mentioned that a Hungarian front company was involved in funneling money to Tenet media.^[17] While the company was not specifically named in the text, several people involved with Tenet Media had connections to Hungarian media and have worked with Hungarian government-funded organizations.^{[20][21][22][23]} Given the context of Hungary's recently intensifying anti-Western turn, these possible connections piqued my interest and I set out on a quest to review all the information I could find regarding the covert propaganda activities of the Russian state in Hungary.

Tanks for Ukraine?

In 2014, war broke out in Eastern Ukraine.^[24] A controversy emerged when Russia's Foreign Ministry accused Hungary of arming Ukraine. This accusation was based on a report in a Hungarian online newspaper called Hídfő, which published a story featuring pictures of T-72 tanks being transported by rail, allegedly destined for Ukraine, along with documents related to defense tenders for the sale of T-72 tanks.^{[25][26][27][28]}

Hungary’s Foreign Ministry was quick to deny the accusation.^[25] The military presented evidence that the tanks pictured did not leave the country, and even allowed Russia’s military attaché to inspect the tanks in person.^[29] As it turns out, the tanks were relocated to another warehouse, because the building that previously housed them was privatized.^[30][25]

The documents presented about the sale tender were real, but related to a separate matter. The buyer was a Czech company with 15 years of experience in trading with tanks. The tanks were sold at reduced price because they were not even in battle-worthy condition.^[30] These tanks eventually reached their destination in Prague by road, not rail. A journalist even followed a truck transporting one of the tanks all the way to Prague to make sure they are not headed to Ukraine.^[31]

Even the original article presented by Hídfő hedged claims about the tanks being sent to Ukraine: while the title claimed that the tanks are on their way to the Ukraine conflict, the text said this claim was only based on the fact that Ukraine is Hungary’s only neighbor that was actively at war.^[27]

It is unlikely that Hungary was involved in arming Ukraine during this conflict. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government was committed to closer collaboration with Russia at the time, and Orbán was lobbying the EU against sanctioning Russia.^[25][28]

Another interesting piece of evidence is that the Czech company that bought the tanks created a Hungarian sister company to be able to compete in the sale tender. This freshly created company chose to set up its account at Sberbank, a bank owned by the Russian government. If they were involved in covert arms sales to a country at war with Russia, they would not have chosen a bank owned by the Russian government to handle the transaction.^[25]

Despite overwhelming evidence that the story was false, the Russian accusation made it into Western media, and some outlets such as VICE reported that the tanks were likely given to Ukraine, suggesting that this was part of a pattern of NATO countries secretly arming Ukraine in response to Russian aggression.^[32]

Why did Russia (falsely) accuse Hungary?

It’s hard to know Russia's exact motives for making such a hostile false allegation in the context of blossoming Russia-Hungary relations, but it might be helpful to understand the historical context.

In 2007, Orbán was the leader of the opposition in Hungary. It might be surprising, but back then, he was a staunch critic of Russia. He often made scornful comments about Russia's geopolitical role in the region. In March of 2007, he said: "Oil might come from the East, but freedom comes from the West",^[33][34] and at a conference organized by his party, Fidesz, he criticized the European policy of importing fossil fuels from Russia, hinting at concerns that Russia's government was using the fossil fuel industry as an instrument of power.^[35]

This remark angered Russian ambassador Igor Savolsky, who was present at the party event as a regular attendee. Although he was not asked to speak, he jumped to the podium to address Orbán and the audience, saying that Orbán's claims of state dominance in Russia's energy sector are baseless and Russian energy companies operate the same way as Western energy companies. At the end of his impromptu speech, he turned directly to Orbán and finished in a threatening tone: "Do we understand each other?"^[35]

Orbán's views on Russia did a U-turn shortly before he became prime minister for a second time in 2010, and by 2014, he was committed to close collaboration with Russia^[36][37][38] and an energy policy dependent on Russia's exports.^[39] He even publicly repudiated Western values, declaring his system an 'illiberal democracy' and praising the benefits of the political systems of countries like Russia.^[40][41][42]

We might speculate that the tank incident was simply Putin reminding Orbán who his daddy is - or perhaps they simply jumped at the first opportunity to plant the seeds of a narrative of NATO aggression against Russia.

Neo-Nazi websites - the media diet of a ministry employee?

In their accusation, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs cited the Hungarian website Hídfő.net. This website was created in 2012 by a Neo-Nazi organization called Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal (Hungarian National Front).^[43][44]

Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal (abbreviated MNA) was originally founded as Magyar Nemzetiszocialista Akciócsoport (Hungarian National Socialist Action Group) in 1989. The group's founder, István Győrkös, was connected to American Neo-Nazi Gary Lauck, who was the biggest supplier of Neo-Nazi material in Germany at the time. Győrkös became the editor of the Hungarian edition of Lauck's newspaper "New Order."^[45][46]

The Soviet Union was ending its military occupation of Hungary at the time, and Soviet soldiers were gradually withdrawn from the country. Győrkös bought rockets and ammunition from homeward-bound Soviet soldiers and began training a paramilitary group. They began a campaign of anti-Semitic agitation—first using foreign-language material obtained through Lauck, later with their own material printed in the United States.^[45]

In 1992, after a political scandal regarding Neo-Nazi activity in Hungarian politics, the parliament started drafting a law that would criminalize certain uses of Nazi symbolism. At the same time, Győrkös and his son were tried and found guilty on gun charges and incitement to hatred. Despite the charges, Győrkös received a slap on the wrist—suspended imprisonment—and was allowed to continue his political activity, albeit under a name that didn't include "National Socialist."^[45]

A world, where employees at the Russian Ministry of Defense read fringe Neo-Nazi newspapers edited by someone like Győrkös, is a strange world. Trusting it enough to start a diplomatic spat based upon it makes it stranger.

More on Hídfő

There were other oddities. Hídfő was possibly one of the first websites in Hungary to offer Vkontakte integration. Vkontakte is a Russian social media platform that was virtually unknown in the Hungarian market at the time. Hídfő's coverage of world events was similar to Russian government narratives.^[47][28]

Similarly to Tenet Media and the content in the "Doppelganger" campaign, the content of Hídfő was widely described as controversial and divisive. Experts on the topic often claim that most disinformation campaigns do not aim to directly implant a narrative, but to create confusion and doubt, making it more difficult for the target audience to trust factually accurate information and narratives from reliable sources. This was certainly true in the case of Tenet Media, and definitely part of the story when it comes to Hídfő.^[48][49][17]

In the case of Tenet Media, the importance of actual editorial control by RT employees was negligible, and mostly focused on amplifying other channels of disinformation by retweeting and liking their content on social media. Much of the content published on Tenet Media was not even originally produced for Tenet Media, and the producers of the content might have never received direct instructions.^[17]

In the case of Hídfő, most of the content was not coming from already existing voices within Hungary, but might not have been original either. A study by CRCB analyzed the content using linguistic profiling and found that the text contains linguistic characteristics that are uncommon for text originally written in Hungarian, but are common in text written in Russian or text written in Russian and later translated to Hungarian. I could not find any definite information that would explain this phenomenon, but it might suggest that the authors were receiving content direction and source material from Russia, or had independently sourced their content from Russian media.^[48]

The 2014 tank story showed how Hídfő published content that directly served Russian interests and narratives. On another occasion, they published the Hungarian translation of a Russian study that claims that the United States is using a secret network of NGOs and political parties to execute "silent coups" across the globe. The study was written by American-born Russian political analyst Andrew Korybko.^[50]

In general, when it comes to world events, geopolitics and politically divisive issues, the content of the website has been described as pro-Russian^[26]; MNA's websites also cover matters of far-right ideology^[51][52] and positive coverage of far-right and fascist parties across the globe, such as the Syrian Social Nationalist Party^[53]. They frequently released articles about their rivalries and disagreements with other far-right groups in Hungary^[54]

In 2025, seeing "Russophilia" on the far right is the most natural thing, but I was surprised to see it in MNA. Let me explain why.

Not always the biggest fans of Russia

MNA founder Győrkös's personal story is a good starting point.

Győrkös first got involved with Nazis while serving a prison sentence. The reason for his incarceration: his involvement in the 1956 armed uprising against the Soviet subordination of Hungary.^[55]

The main slogan of the 1956 movement was "Russians go home" and they sought to distance Hungary from Moscow's influence.^[56] Győrkös was released as part of a general amnesty, but only re-started his political activism when political repression started waning. When he founded his Neo-Nazi movement, Hungary was still technically under Soviet military occupation: Hungary's full sovereignty was only formally restored in 1991, in a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union.^[55][57]

But Győrkös was far from the only person in Hungarian far-right circles in the "Russians go home" camp. In the early '90s, Kemál György Ekrem became one of Győrkös's closest associates. Ekrem's father, Kemál Ekrem was second-in-command in the armed rebellion in 1956, and received a death sentence after the rebels were crushed by the Red Army.^[58][59][60]

Just like Győrkös himself, Ekrem had his own run-ins with the law. In 1996, he created Kommunizmus Üldözötteinek Szövetsége (Alliance of those Persecuted by Communism). There is no doubt that Ekrem's life was tragically impacted by Communism, but the name of the organization masked its true nature: in reality it was a Neo-Nazi organization planning to overthrow the government. After the plan was foiled, Kemál György Ekrem received gun charges and charges for his involvement in planning a coup d'etat, and received a prison sentence.^[61]

There are a few more events that demonstrate the far-right's negative attitudes towards Russia: in 1992 - on the anniversary of the 1956 uprising - police foiled a plot after seizing explosives from a Neo-Nazi group. According to a declassified report, the group wanted to destroy the memorial of fallen Soviet soldiers on Liberty square, Budapest.^[62]

In 1997, Győrkös had a falling out with his close associate, Albert Szabó, because Győrkös believed that Szabó was "bought off by Russia".^[63]

In plain English: in the 1990s, MNA and other Hungarian far-right groups were as far as it gets from Russophilia, and were frequently openly hostile to the Soviet Union and Russia, and even risked jail time to express this opinion.

How Russia got involved

Discovery of the Russian link

In the 2010s, numerous rumors and accusations surfaced regarding Russian involvement with right-wing and far-right organizations in Hungary. Lingering trauma from the Soviet era kept anti-Russian sentiment widespread. As a result, accusing political opponents of collaborating with Russia was sometimes seen as an effective tool for discrediting them. However, as we’ll see, not all of these accusations were unfounded.^[64][65][66]

Hungarian National Front (MNA) and Hídfő were politically insignificant even domestically, yet their fabricated story about Hungary supplying arms to Ukraine wasn’t their only act to attract international attention. They made headlines in the New York Times in 2016, when Győrkös fatally shot a police officer who was executing a search warrant at his house, looking for illegal firearms.^[67]

This tragic event shed light on the depth of MNA’s ties to Russia. Newspapers reported that MNA’s paramilitary units trained alongside members of Russian military intelligence as many as five times a year. Despite MNA’s history of legal troubles, Hungarian authorities were unable to intervene, as the activities—carried out with airsoft weapons—were technically considered a legal sport.^[63][68]

The killing prompted sweeping police raids that exposed the group’s substantial arsenal. Thirteen search warrants led to the recovery of a significant cache of illegal firearms, explosives, ammunition, and extremist propaganda. In one family home alone, authorities uncovered more than 30 guns, thousands of rounds of ammunition, and a kilogram of explosives. In total, 17 individuals faced weapons charges, and 2 were indicted for incitement against Jews and migrants.^{[69][70][71][72]}

To begin exploring how we got here, let's go back to the 2000s to understand the political climate in which the shift likely happened.

Turbulent times in Hungary

By 2004, Hungary was a member of the European Union and NATO which formalized its membership in the "Western World".^[73][74]

The year 2006 was a turbulent one in Hungary, marked by intense political tensions and riots. Although geopolitics was not the central focus of these disturbances, Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány faced criticism for his perceived closeness to Russia. Far-right rioters once again damaged the Soviet memorial on Liberty Square. Around this time, Kemál György Ekrem, recently released from prison, spoke at a protest, but Győrkös’s MNA refused to participate.^[75][76]

At this time, authorities were already aware of MNA’s paramilitary activities. These activities became known to the public in 2009, when a German far-left newspaper published videos of their training camps.^[77][78]

This period nearly coincided with another significant development: the far-right party Jobbik began adopting elements of MNA’s strategy and symbolism. Rather than resorting to illegal tactics, however, Jobbik aimed to advance its agenda by gaining political office. Initially, Jobbik was as fiercely anti-Russian as other far-right groups, but shifted toward a Russophile stance when Béla Kovács became responsible for foreign affairs at the party. Kovács was later elected to the European Parliament and became a member of the EU’s Budget Committee.^[66][79][80]

In a later scandal that earned him the nickname "K. G. Béla", Béla Kovács was unmasked as a Russian spy. At this time Jobbik was poised to become Viktor Orbán's main challenger, and the scandal was used to tarnish the character of Jobbik's leadership.^[81][82]

Now that we have an idea of the context, let's look at how and when the cooperation started.

Beginnings of the cooperation

It is possible that individuals with connections similar to Jobbik's Kovács’s appeared in MNA's circles around 2006, potentially explaining the group’s decision not to participate in the anti-Soviet vandalism. However, no public evidence confirming a Russian link exists from that period. I could also not find any sources reporting on covert Russian operations involving MNA. In 2012, an internal dispute led one MNA member to leak internal messages which show that Győrkös actively sought Russian assistance. That same year, MNA’s website, Hídfő, was launched with Russian support.^[50][26]

Considering that Győrkös and most of his far-right allies used to hate Russia with passion, we have to ask ourselves: what led to this extreme shift?

To answer this question, first we have to establish that he did so of his own accord. Let's break down why I believe that he was not recruited using any common coercive method:

• He practically grew up in prison and remained under surveillance for many years. Given his previous legal issues, he likely assumed that the police were aware of his activities. These circumstances may have taught him to cope with psychological pressure and intimidation.^[83]
• He kept assault rifles in his home and led a paramilitary group that trained regularly outdoors. While this demonstrates his familiarity with weaponry and combat scenarios, it does not definitively prove that he would be immune to physical intimidation. Still, it suggests a certain resilience and willingness to confront dangers directly.^[67]
• Despite his numerous run-ins with the law, Győrkös continued to engage in high-risk activities, suggesting that he had a high tolerance for danger. He also involved his entire family in these ventures. Moreover, by 2012 he was already 72 years old, surpassing the average male life expectancy in Hungary. Taken together, these factors do not suggest that he was the type of individual who would readily submit to blackmail.^[45][83][84]

So if coercion is not the answer, we have to look at different reasons why he could have been motivated to collaborate by their own volition.

The departing members alleged that one of Győrkös’s sons refuses to work a real job and uses MNA’s money to cover his living costs. Even if that is true, greed is unlikely to have been the main motivation to seek Russian support. Győrkös was known to be a simple, laid-back person who never had a lavish lifestyle, and it seems that he invested most of his resources into building a training camp for MNA.^[50][55]

There is evidence to suggest that Győrkös was keen on earning the respect of people he admires. In his 1992 criminal trial, the court presented evidence that Győrkös intentionally inflated the size of MNA in his communication with Gary Lauck. According to the judge, the sole purpose of this was to increase MNA's prestige within this international far-right network. This move had no practical benefit other than showing off, but it increased the risk of drawing attention to the organization's illegal activities if the communication was to be intercepted.^[45]

I consider this to be the most likely psychological motive, but it still doesn't explain why Győrkös would be drawn towards Russia instead of just relying on international collaboration with other Neo-Nazi groups like he did in the 1990s. I believe that exploring the international context could help us better understand this as well.

See, most Neo-Nazis like Győrkös were not just fiercely anti-Russian, but they were just as harshly critical of "Western Values", capitalism, democracy and the United States' role in the world. In the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s, the spread of globalization and Western-style democracies seemed unstoppable - but a new anti-liberal hero would soon step on the stage.

In 2007, in his now famous Munich speech, Vladimir Putin criticized the United States's dominance in international relations. In his speech he challenged the European Union's and NATO's right to extend into countries like Hungary and Poland. In 2008, with the Russian invasion of Georgia, Putin showed the world that this wasn't all talk.

Vladimir Putin, alongside Barack Obama, became a central character in online meme culture in the 2010s. But many who dislike Western countries' role in international politics considered him not only to be memeable, but also a hero and a role model.^[85]

On one hand, collaboration with Russia might be a tough pill to swallow for a previously anti-Soviet and Russophobic movement. On the other hand, Vladimir Putin presented a credible plan to dismantle the post-Cold War status quo that Neo-Nazis so despised - and his plans directly involved distancing countries like Hungary from Western alliance systems.

We know that Győrkös likes to get external validation from people he looks up to: previously he was willing to work with an American whom he respected. Perhaps this - and being overshadowed by Jobbik - made him more open to this collaboration.

As we will see, working with Russia was only the beginning of their unlikely decisions.

Collaboration with Communists

In 2012, shortly after Hídfő was launched, activists of the far-left Hungarian Workers’ Party and Győrkös's fascists organized a protest together in the city of Érd, when a member of the far-left party was threatened with eviction.^[86][87]

It shocked me to see this level of open collaboration between a far-left and a far-right group, so I wanted to understand how each side can justify it.

Communist bridge building

To understand how Communists could justify working with Nazis, first let's explore their party's historical and ideological background.

After defeating the 1956 uprising, the Soviet Union placed János Kádár in power, which meant that his Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP) became the new dominant party in Hungary’s de facto single-party state, and the country was kept under a de facto Soviet military occupation.^[88][89]

By the late 1980s, Kádár’s mental and physical health was rapidly declining, which coincided with Gorbachev’s new “Sinatra Doctrine” of allowing Warsaw Pact nations to have broad control over their own internal affairs.^[90]

When the moribund Kádár retired, MSZMP’s new leadership announced a radically new vision under the slogan “Democracy, Rule of Law, Socialism”. In 1989, the party’s new chairman Rezső Nyers gave a speech detailing his commitment to democratic and market reform. This led to a party split, with those in favor of the new direction rallying under the new name “Hungarian Socialist Party” (MSZP) proposed by Nyers.^[91][89]

The hard-line Soviet loyalists opposed to democratic reforms united under Gyula Thürmer’s chairmanship. They originally kept the old name, but later went through a series of rebranding attempts, finally settling on their current name, Hungarian Workers' Party in 2013.

As Hungary escaped the Soviet Union’s grip, there was widespread support for the political and economic reform, and a new Western-oriented direction in foreign policy. When the last Russian soldier left Hungary, few people had a positive view on Russia, and most preferred Western alliance systems. In the 1997 referendum, 85% supported joining NATO,^[92] and even the least pro-NATO regions voted 81% or above for NATO membership.^[93]

Socialists received disappointing results in the first democratic elections in 1990, but the reformist MSZP won a landslide victory in 1994 and fared decently in 1998.^[94]

Gyula Thürmer continued to represent an anti-Western direction after the fall of the Soviet Union. In 1995 he released a book titled “Nem kell a NATO” (“We don't want NATO”) and the party attempted to organize referendums to prevent Hungary's accession to the organization. They failed to grow a strong voter base behind these policies and failed to win parliamentary seats in any election between 1990 and 2022.

Given their less-than-stellar electoral performance and the party’s descent into obscurity, it is understandable that Thürmer would seek the help of others. It is not so surprising that he visited Lukashenko in Minsk,^[95] celebrated the CCP in an interview in Chinese media^[96] and that he is planning to visit the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in 2025.^[97][98]

Given Thürmer and his party’s lasting reluctance to work with the new Socialist party and their fondness of hard-line Communist orthodoxy and its nostalgic symbols, it’s surprising that they would now be ready to incorporate foreign elements in their worldview.

Let's see how exactly they did that.

Adoption of far right ideological elements

To most of the far-right in Hungary, the status of historical Hungarian diaspora living in neighboring countries can only be addressed by re-annexing territories that historically belonged to Hungary.

In contrast, as Thürmer described in an interview, 20th century socialists of the region assumed that the socialist system will eventually solve all “problems of historical origin”: such as ethnic, linguistic and border disputes within the region. He now believes that this assumption was mistaken.^[99]

While he believes that defending socialism was a much more urgent problem than things like minority rights, he regrets that the Socialist party failed to channel these problems within the Socialist system, leaving it up for grabs for “Capitalists”.^[99]

In 2016, Thürmer gave a speech addressing the subject of territorial revision. In his speech, he stated that Hungarian men and women must pass down the knowledge of the tragedy that the loss of territory represents to Hungarians.^[100]

He mentioned that the examples of Macau and Hong Kong being reincorporated into China, and Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territories demonstrate that territorial revision is possible, and said that Hungary lost many opportunities for territorial revision after 1990 because such revision was not in the interests of the “Capitalist class”.^[100]

He also opined that Hungary should not have approved Romania's European Union membership without getting any concessions from them, and said that approving Ukraine's EU accession would be a mistake that would further cement Hungary's borders.^[100] He also said that he is not in favor of the European Union's pro-migrant policies.^[100]

Some of these ideas have widespread appeal in Hungary, but most are considered extreme views. What is common in most of these talking points though, is that they are the bread-and-butter of Hungary’s far-right.

Since Thürmer was an avid Marxist with chronic nostalgia for the Soviet times, I would not expect anything less than him seeing the “capitalist class” as some sort of internal enemy, sabotaging the betterment of working-class lives at every opportunity.

It’s a little bit less clear why he would think that a “capitalist class” would be against Hungary annexing territories inhabited by Hungarian minorities: this would have been a great opportunity for businesses to obtain cheap working force and to sell their products to a larger customer base, customs-free. Not to mention that these neighboring countries were also socialist, with most businesses owned by the state. Therefore, private businesses could have benefited from taking over businesses previously owned by a foreign government.

Also, while the power of businessmen was certainly growing, Hungary hardly had a well-established “capitalist class” at the time, especially in the early 1990s. Private business was extremely limited in the Communist system, and the number of private businesses that had employees was still in the low thousands at the end of 1990, compared to over half a million today.^[101][102]

While the notion of an "internal enemy" appears in both far-left and far-right ideologies, its interpretation differs significantly. In far-left circles, this enemy is typically cast as saboteurs of the socialist order—traitors undermining the system from within—not as obstacles to territorial ambitions.

By contrast, within the Hungarian far right, there is a deeply rooted belief in a global conspiracy orchestrated by “capitalist financiers,” “liberals,” “Zionists,” or often simply “the Jews”. We will explore this more thoroughly later, but for now, it is enough to highlight a pervasive narrative: that Hungary’s historical misfortunes—particularly its unsuccessful attempts at territorial revision—were the result of Jewish sabotage. István Csurka's far-right newspaper put it this way: “the Hungarian nation is groaning in the net of international Jewry”.^[103][104]

Considering the circumstances of collaboration with Neo-Nazis, perhaps these comments were designed to be heard as veiled confessions of anti-Semitic beliefs by far-right listeners. Indeed, Thürmer's "Trianon speech" got positive reception on a website associated with MNA.^[105]

In a 2024 TikTok video, Thürmer doubled down on his views on territorial revision, but this time he explicitly said that Hungary should seek Russia’s help in annexing territories.^[106]

Perhaps this ideological shift will make sense if we explore how people at MNA heard it - or wanted to hear it.

Fascist bridge building

Hídfő and other media associated with István Győrkös's MNA praised Gyula Thürmer’s Communists for their "patriotic approach"^[51] and they received ample and positive coverage.^{[52][54][26][107][108][109][110]} We cannot be certain how many readers agreed with this viewpoint, but it is clear that MNA wanted to persuade them.

Apart from attempting to increase the reputation of Thürmer and his far- left party, Hídfő and other websites associated with MNA also published articles justifying collaboration with Communists from an ideological standpoint.

In addition to bolstering Thürmer and his far-left party’s reputation, Hídfő and other MNA-associated websites published arguments in favor of collaborating with Communists, which attempted to provide ideological justification.

The biggest ideological obstacle was the reputation of the Bolsheviks, who fought against nationalists in the Russian Civil War.

The Bolsheviks were a far-left Marxist-Leninist faction in Russia. They spearheaded the October Revolution which ultimately led to the establishment of the Soviet Union. One of Hídfő’s articles presented their perspective on these events, which focused on the distinction between what they call “real Communists” and “Zionbolsheviks”.^[52]

Grasping the term “Zionbolshevik” can be helpful to understand their framing of the birth of the Soviet Union. The term is a dual reference to the conspiracy theories “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion”, and “Jewish Bolshevism”.

The Protocols of the Elders of Zion is an anti-Semitic fabrication published in 1903 in the Russian Empire. This text purports to detail the guidelines for a secret Jewish plot of world domination and has since inspired many other anti-Semitic conspiracy theories.

Jewish Bolshevism is an anti-Semitic conspiracy theory that alleges that the October Revolution was a Jewish plot. In MNA's version of this theory, “the Jews” hijacked the Bolshevik movement for the purpose of establishing Jewish world domination,^[52] but Stalin was a "national" Communist and he purged "Zionbolsheviks" such as Trotsky.^[52][26]

This account of the October revolution maintains the notion of a Jewish conspiracy as an element of the story while also enabling the interpretation of Communism as a legitimate grassroots political movement - one that does not inherently undermine nationalist sensibilities.

Be that as it may, they are not strict about their interpretation of nationalism, at least not as most on the right-wing would understand it: they praised Aleksander Dugin’s ideas of National Bolshevism and Eurasianism, and said that Thürmer’s Munkáspárt should be considered a partner in building a Eurasian Empire that could rival the United States - with Russia at its helm. They emphasized the distinction between this vision and the idea of merely building a strong nation-state.^[52]

Furthermore, they called out “fundamentalist” far-righters for chasing “unrealistic pipe dreams” as opposed to working within Russia’s geopolitical agenda. This is above all a rejection of the idea that small nations or regional powers can be truly independent.^[52]

One article noted that Thürmer and many in the leadership of Munkáspárt are on board with this project, but the party is still working on convincing many in their support base.^[52]

They also addressed the topic of war between Communists and Fascists: in their view, this war is over, just like the war between Protestants and Catholics is over: while theoretical disagreements remain, they share their basic values because their modern Hungarism is a movement of the working class, not a movement of freeloaders and exploiters.^[51][111]

They further said that only members of the working class can be part of the nation and also classified their far-right rival, Jobbik, as a bourgeois party. They defined working class people as people who earn their living by carrying out productive activities according to their ability.^[51][54]

Impact

In 1989, when MNA was founded, Hungary was still in the process of rebuilding its full autonomy and only became a fully sovereign state in 1991, after signing a treaty with the Soviet Union.^[57]

Although MNA never enjoyed broad popular support nor sought political office, its activities had a disproportionate impact on the newly independent nation’s political climate. By re-importing anti-Semitic propaganda, the group was a catalyst that rekindled collective anxieties. The Hungarian state collaborated in the execution of more than half a million of its Jewish citizens before the Red Army seized control of the country - but during Communist rule, public discussion of Jewish life and history was suppressed and remained a taboo until 1989.^{[112][113][45]}

The group also introduced many aspects of far-right subculture that were later adopted by groups with more direct political significance, such as Jobbik. These elements include paramilitary training, youth recruitment tactics such as hiking groups and rock music, commemoration of controversial historical figures and now-ubiquitous far-right symbols such as the “Árpád-stripes”.^[55]

These aspects of the group’s impact predate any known Russian involvement.

Information Laundering

The term “information laundering” refers to the filtration of information from unverified sources into the mainstream. Similarly to money laundering, information laundering can hide the true source of information.

By hiding the true origin of the information, the sender of the information maintains plausible deniability. “Dry snitching” is American prison slang for covert ways of becoming an informant while attempting to avoid repercussions from fellow inmates. “Dry snitching” could be seen as an example of information laundering at a personal scale.^[114]

People have an inherent tendency to rely on the trustworthiness of the messenger rather than evaluating a message truly on its merits: a successful attempt at information laundering bypasses this psychological safety mechanism by getting a reliable source to repeat the information.

Relevance is another factor that influences the spread of information. When a politician, media personality or any relevant speaker engages with a message - even if the form of their engagement is a rebuttal - they elevate the message from a boundless sea of unimportant truths and falsehoods into the category of subjects at least worth debating. Thus, irrelevance is another obstacle that information laundering can help bypass.

The 2014 story which accuses Hungary of arming Ukraine is a great example of information laundering: while the involvement of Russian government agencies is relatively transparent in this case, Hídfő’s article at least provided some level of credibility to the accusation. Hídfő’s obscurity might have even helped in this case, since at first glance it might have been mistaken for citizens' investigative journalism.

Despite the fact that Hídfő was not a widely known newspaper even in Hungary, and not even among the best known far-right newspapers at the time, the story eventually made its way to mainstream newspapers in Hungary, such as Index.hu and 168Óra and later spread to other European newspapers such as Rzeczpospolita and Wyborcza.^[115]

Investigative journalists and government authorities presented overwhelming evidence that no tanks were sold to Ukraine - Hungary’s armed forces even allowed Russia’s military attaché to personally inspect the tanks that were allegedly sold to Ukraine.

But the accusation spread much faster than the rebuttal: by the time the news got to some Western media outlets, all nuance was lost. When VICE reported on the story, their article used the story to tell a narrative of NATO secretly arming Ukraine.

As we have seen in the case of the "tank article", while the story made it into international media, its rebuttals did not. In fact, its significance was even amplified: when VICE reported on this story, they already hinted at a general pattern of NATO arming Ukraine, with Hungarian tanks being allegedly transported to Ukraine being the cornerstone of this narrative.^[32]

Although the narrative could not be supported by the “secret tank sale”, in hindsight there was a kernel of truth to this sentiment: discussions of supporting Ukraine did intensify in the weeks following the release of the story, but when Ukraine received help it was not done in secret. President Poroshenko of Ukraine asked President Obama for assistance: the United States refused to supply Ukraine with lethal weapons, but did provide other forms of equipment such as body armor and binoculars.^[116]

NATO troops began a drill to help Ukrainian soldiers train to fight separatists in Eastern Ukraine, but this was also not done in secret and could not be interpreted as a hostile action. In fact, NATO and Russia held a joint military drill just a year before. Russia also held naval exercises on the Black Sea and military drills near Ukraine’s eastern borders - yet denied any hostile action.^[117][118]

Political mobilization

A problem political movements often face is that widespread support for a candidate, political party or policy position does not automatically guarantee an ability to get people to engage in political action.

Researchers often observe significantly lower voter turnouts for younger populations. For instance, in the 2020 US Presidential elections, voters over 65 were nearly 45% more likely to cast their vote than voters under 24.^[119][120]

Younger citizens might be less likely to vote, but they are often more likely to engage in more active forms of political action: a study involving nearly one million respondents from 128 countries shows that in the 2010s, about 26% of younger, politically active individuals participated in protests as opposed to only 12% of their older counterparts.^[121]

One obvious consequence of these factors is that some ideas - especially those important to younger voters - struggle to gain traction through formal political institutions despite their popularity in grassroots movements. But sometimes it’s equally important to back electoral success with visible support on the streets.

This was plain to see in 2024 in Romania, when far-right conspiracy theorist Călin Georgescu won the first round of the elections, capturing 23% of votes. When the supreme court annulled the results citing “aggressive hybrid Russian attacks”, Georgescu’s supporters remained remarkably silent. Just over 100 people protested at a polling station where the second round of the voting would have happened.^[122] In fact, more people protested against Georgescu after election day.^[123]

MNA has demonstrated superior ability to mobilize its core members. They were not only able to attract people to activities with relatively strong appeal with young right-wingers, but also managed to bring them to less stimulating events such as memorial services.

The most striking example is the 1992 booing of President Árpád Göncz’s speech. MNA members - possibly reinforced with visiting German Neo-Nazis - gathered on the square in front of the Parliament, and started booing even before Göncz could begin his speech. Due to the intense booing, the president walked off the stage.^{[63][124][125]}

At the time of these events, Göncz was among the most popular politicians in Hungary.^[124] This opened another chapter in the post-Communist “Media War” in Hungary - a metaphorical war between political parties, fought for securing influence over Hungary’s state media. A popular journalist at state media was falsely accused of partially fabricating the story, and was let go on disciplinary grounds.^[126][127] Some politicians then suggested that authorities might have aided or even orchestrated the affair, and some suggested that the Prime Minister should also be held responsible.^[128] Even 20 years later, a Socialist politician had to resign after a picture of him in the booing crowd was released.^[129]

On another occasion, a small group of bald men used the combination of brute force and a legal loophole to impede a referendum.^[130]

Thus, while groups like MNA are hardly a factor in politics on their own, their actions can be instrumental and catalytic in how events play out - and their abilities might be needed in areas where “conventional” political groups don’t excel. Although the effects of such political action cannot always be predicted.

Violence & Sowing division

In 2008 and 2009, a series of terrorist attacks against Romani people shook Hungary. MNA was not involved in these attacks, but one of the perpetrators was connected to the group and used to regularly attend their events, later moving on to another extremist group, Véres Kard. (Blood-stained Sword). This helped establish the racist motive for the attacks during his trial.^[55]

The objective of this series of attacks was to incite an ethnic conflict in Hungary.^[131]

As mentioned earlier in this article, another of Győrkös’s former associates, Kemál György Ekrem, was sentenced to jail for his involvement in a planned coup d’etat.^[132] At another time, a suspect connected to a group led by Kemál György Ekrem was caught manufacturing bombs, but claimed that he was a lone actor. In another similar incident, the suspect committed suicide.^[133]

The turmoil in the wake of racist terrorist attacks demonstrates that small but violent radical groups can sow fear and division even when their activity does not pose a challenge to state authority.

But looking further back in history, we notice that radical groups can have a really serious effect on politics, and such effects can be amplified during times of crisis.

In the interwar period, competition for places in higher education and intellectual professions quickly became more bitter. Non-Jewish students saw the expulsion of Jews from universities as the solution to this problem. Students formed paramilitary organizations which regularly bullied Jewish students and professors, and impeded their entrance to university premises. Beatings often led to severe injuries, yet university leadership usually tolerated these violent activities.^[134]

Some anti-Semitic, student groups, such as Turul and Hungária became politically influential, and their “activism” was seen positively by many in parliament. Inspired by the students claim that Jews don’t deserve to be in higher education, parliament approved a racial quota law. Due to international pressure, the law omitted direct references to Jews, but an executive order clarified that the Jewish religion has to be considered a race or ethnic group in the implementation of the law.^[134]

The acceptance of this law - and openly anti-Semitic speech in parliament - normalized anti-Semitism in public speech and led to a series of violations of Jewish civil rights.^[134]

Conclusion

This brief look into news of Russian involvement in a Hungarian extremist group shows that foreign influence efforts cannot be understood as a simple top-down model of hammering government messages. Instead, we observe a mixture of top-down planning and aiding partially autonomous groups who collaborate through a partially organic network, and across porous ideological boundaries.

Some of those who consider themselves to be against “Western values” and liberal democracy can be observed to form unlikely alliances. This could be simply motivated by pragmatic considerations: those who believe in liberal democracy might emphasize the positive aspects of the “lesser evil” among candidates. Similarly, those who are opposed to liberal democracy might emphasize the positive aspects of anyone with a real chance of destroying that democracy.

This goal is equally served by any divisive and controversial information. A flood of falsehoods and contradicting narratives can create an overwhelming sense of confusion. An accurate perception of reality depends not only on separating truth from lies, but also on our ability to treat everything in its place in terms of its relative importance. This is made more difficult when our mental capacity is burdened by an overwhelming amount of controversial and contradicting information.

Underground extremist groups have little power and influence in normal times, but may be able to take swift action when a severe crisis presents itself. In other words, while most of these groups go nowhere (other than prison), the few that go somewhere are those who were ready to seize any opportunity.

Ultimately, disinformation in the 21st century is part of a war on liberal democracies, where the opponents of liberal democracies might not fully align on ideological grounds, but they do align on seeing liberal democracies and the “Western World Order” as the bigger evil. We can also see that the sense of personal importance and pride that often characterizes autocratic leaders can also be mirrored in small fringe organizations.

Techniques such as information laundering have been successful at eluding resistance to disinformation, because it helps disinformation reach even those who try to carefully avoid it.

Disinformation and extremist ideas, even when they don’t reach widespread influence directly, can serve as fodder for political actors who capitalize on them by making them more palatable to mainstream audiences. And the case of Kovács’s infiltration into Jobbik’s leadership shows that foreign actors have a real chance to influence how this process unfolds.

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